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Abstract
This article provides a comprehensive discussion of the two unform Model Acts that furnish the
governing standards for the recognition and enforcement by U.S. courts of monetary judgments
entered abroad. The Model Acts have been adopted by a majority of U.S. states, but because some
states have not adopted them, this article also addresses the common law considerations applied in
those non-adopting states in determining whether to recognize and enforce foreign monetary judg-
ments. This article includes a discussion of U.S. case law interpreting the requirements and discre-
tionary considerations identified under both the Model Acts and American common law, and
addresses some of the procedures that a litigant must undertake in most U.S. jurisdictions in seek-
ing to obtain recognition and enforcement of a foreign monetary judgment.
While the article addresses the factors that are considered by U.S. courts in giving recognition to
a monetary judgmentfrom any foreign court, its focus is on judgments entered in different regions
of China, and the burden of proof necessary to obtain an American court's recognition and enforce-
ment of a judgment entered in China against a U.S. company doing business abroad.
Finally, this article addresses the approach taken by some foreign countries in determining
whether to recognize judgments entered in the United States, and explains how and why that
standard differs from the standard applied by U.S. courts in giving recognition to foreign
judgments.
* Mr. Moedritzer is a Partner and Ms. Whittaker is Of Counsel, both in the Business Litigation Section
at Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP in Kansas City, MO. Ms. Ye is a Partner with King & Wood in its Beijing/
Guangzhou, China office. The authors were part of the team that represented the plaintiffs in Hubei
Gezhouba Sanlian, believed to be the first case where a monetary judgment entered in the People's Republic of
China was granted recognition by a court in the United States.
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I. Introduction
Your new client, a Chinese business owner, has come to you for help in enforcing a
monetary judgment entered by a court in China against a U.S. company that breached a
contract, committed a tort, or otherwise engaged in illegal conduct abroad. The client
wants to know the requirements and procedures for obtaining recognition and enforce-
ment of the foreign judgment in the United States. How do you advise your client?
This article provides a roadmap to the governing laws and a discussion of each require-
ment and discretionary factor used by U.S. courts to evaluate whether to recognize and
enforce a foreign monetary judgment, with a particular focus on the enforceability of Chi-
nese judgments.
II. Overview of Framework for Obtaining Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Money Judgments in the United States
A. LAw GENERALLY
Currently, the United States is not a party to any bilateral treaties or multilateral inter-
national conventions on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments. The
principal reason for this absence is the perception of many foreign jurisdictions that U.S.
monetary judgments are excessive according to foreign notions of liability.' In addition,
foreign courts have objected to the breadth of extraterritorial jurisdiction asserted by
courts in the United States.2 Notwithstanding the absence of a treaty or convention pro-
viding for the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the United
States is among the most liberal of nations in recognizing and enforcing the judgments of
foreign courts.3 And while there is some difference of opinion on this point, there is also a
general belief that current U.S. law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments exhibits a relatively high degree of uniformity.4
In the absence of any controlling federal law, the recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments in the United States is governed by state law and the principles of comity,
reciprocity, and res judicata.5 A party seeking to enforce a foreign judgment, decree, or
order in the United States must generally file suit before a competent U.S. court, and the
court will determine whether to give effect to the foreign judgment.6 Cases seeking rec-
1. See Panagiota Kelali, Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation in the Internet Era: What is in the US.
Best Interest?, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 263, 291 (2006); Matthew H. Adler, If We Build It,
Will They Come?-The Need for a Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary
Judgments, 26 GEO. J. INT'L L. 79, 93-94 (1994).
2. See Peter Trooboff, Judgments Enforced, 30 NAT'L L. J. 12 (2007); see also Adler, supra note 1, at 93-94.
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 481-88, Introductory
Note (1987); see also Melinda Luthin, U.S. Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments and the Need for Reform, 14
U.C. DAvIsJ. Nr'L L. & POL'Y 111, 117 (2007).
4. See Matthew B. Berlin, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements Creating an International
Framework for Recognizing Foreign judgments, 3 BYU INT'L L. & MGrr. REv. 43, 52-53 (2006); but see
Luthin, supra note 3, at 120.
5. See Adler, supra note 1, at 84-85.
6. Hennessy v. Marshall, 682 S.W.2d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App. 1984) (default judgment rendered by English
court would not be recognized until plenary suit was filed in the United States for recognition of the judg-
ment and defendant was given opportunity to raise statutory defenses).
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ognition and enforcement of foreign money judgments may be filed in either state or
federal court. State substantive law applies with respect to the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments, but diversity jurisdiction in federal court may be obtained as
well.7
Two Model Acts drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and approved by the American Bar Association have provided states an oppor-
tunity to adopt a concise, uniform statutory framework for the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments, rather than relying on piecemeal case law to define the
governing standard. While one goal behind the drafting of these Model Acts is certainly
to aid the states by providing a standardized, codified version of the case law on the princi-
ples of comity, the far-reaching goal is to encourage other countries to recognize and
enforce U.S. judgments abroad by demonstrating the liberal and concrete standards by
which foreign judgments will be evaluated for recognition in the United States.8
B. THE MODEL AcTs
The first Model Act, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (UFM-
JRA), 13 U.L.A. 149, originally promulgated in 1962, codifies the general common law
principles of comity.9 It provides a set of uniform rules under which U.S. courts may
evaluate monetary judgments from foreign courts to determine whether a judgment is
conclusive and entitled to recognition. The application of the UFM-JRA is not limited to
or exclusive of judgments from any particular countries.' 0 All foreign country judgments
are treated the same and subject to the same tests under the Act. States are free to adopt
the UFM-JRA, or to apply their own common law principles of comity in evaluating a
petitioner's request for recognition of a foreign judgment. As of spring 2010, thirty-two
U.S. states and territories had adopted the UFM-JRA."t
In 2005, the National Conference of Commissioners issued a revised version of the
UFM-JRA, the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, in an ef-
fort to clarify its predecessor's provisions that had caused some confusion in interpreta-
tion, and to provide additional guidance to the courts in states that had adopted the
original UFM-JRA. Many states, however, had already become comfortable with the
original version of the UFM-JRA and, to date, only a relatively small number of states
have adopted the most recent version.12
7. See, e.g., Van Den Biggelaar v. Wagner, 978 F. Supp. 848, 853 (N.D. Ind. 1997).
8. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNTrTON AcT REFs. & ANNoTs., 13 U.L.A. 149, Prefa-
tory Note (1986) [hereinafter UFM-JRA]; see also Luthin, supra note 3, at 120-21.
9. UFM-JRA, 13 U.L.A. 149.
10. Id.
11. As of the writing of this article, states or U.S. territories having adopted some version of the UFM-JRA
included: AL, CA, CO, CT, DE, D.C., FL, GA, HA, ID, IL, IA, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MO, MT, NJ.,
N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., OH, OK, OR, PA, TX, U.S. Virgin Islands, VA, and WA. See UFM-JRA, 13
U.LA. 149.
12. California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, North Caro-
lina, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington have adopted the 2005 version of the UFM-JRA, the Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. See The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About the Unform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, http://
www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufcmjra.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
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Under the UFM-JRA, a foreign judgment is subject to a limited scope inquiry prior to a
court's determination about whether it is entitled to be recognized.' 3 A defendant chal-
lenging recognition of a foreign judgment may not retry issues of liability or damages, but
rather is limited to due process-type defenses enumerated in the statute.14 The UFM-JRA
applies the same basic elements as the common law, but divides foreign judgments into
two basic categories: (1) foreign judgments that are not conclusive (i.e., where denial of
recognition is mandatory for failure to satisfy due process considerations); and (2) foreign
judgments that need not be recognized at the discretion of the reviewing court for lack of
sufficient notice, for fraud, where the decision is contrary to public policy or in conflict
with another judgment, where the dispute was controlled by an alternative dispute resolu-
tion provision, or for forum non conveniens in cases where personal jurisdiction was based
solely on personal service.' 5 Section 3 of the Act provides that a foreign judgment not
falling into either of these two categories is conclusive between the parties, to the extent it
grants or denies recovery of a sum of money.'5
In states that have adopted the UFM-JRA, courts generally look first to the particular
state statute adopting the Act to determine whether a foreign judgment is entitled to rec-
ognition.17 Nevertheless, even where a state court determines that a foreign judgment, or
a portion thereof, is not entitled to recognition under the UFM-JRA, the Act expressly
provides that such a conclusion does not preclude the court from recognizing it under the
general principles of comity.' 8 Finally, the Act does not prescribe a uniform enforcement
procedure, but instead provides that a foreign judgment entitled to recognition will be
enforced in the same manner as a judgment from a sister state that is entitled to full faith
and credit. Pursuant to the comment to Section 3, the method of enforcement will be that
of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1948 (UEFJA) in states that
have adopted that Act.'
13. See Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1995).
14. Id.
15. See UFM-JRA, 13 U.L.A. 149 § 4.
16. Id. § 3 (foreign judgments not involving a decision with respect to a monetary claim or award are not
covered by the UFM-JRA, and are generally not the subject of this article).
17. But see Yu v. Zhang, 885 N.E.2d 278, 284-85 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (in a state that had adopted UFM-
JRA, the court nonetheless applied a less onerous common law test and gave recognition to a divorce and
property division entered in China under general principles of comity, even though wife claimed she did not
receive notice of proceedings in China and that her notarized signatures on agreements related to property
division were forged). Other courts in UJFM-JRA jurisdictions have also, on occasion, inexplicably reverted to
the common law principles of comity in evaluating whether to give recognition to a foreign money judgment.
Usually, however, UFM-JRA states will apply the statute in determining whether to recognize a foreign
judgment.
18. UFM-JRA, 13 U.LA. 149§ 7; See also, Downs v. Yuen, 298 A.D.2d 177 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (enforc-
ing judgment entered in Hong Kong in divorce action awarding wife $10 million, even though portion of
award was for support, which is not enforceable under state statute on recognition of foreign money judg-
ments, but was nonetheless enforceable under general principles of comity); Siko Ventures v. Argyll Equities,
No. SA-05-CA-100-OG, 2005 WL 2233205 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2005) (judgment entered in Hong Kong
holding plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of loan agreement provisions would not be denied
recognition, despite not being a judgment for a specific amount of money as required by Texas' statute on the
recognition of foreign judgments, as statute expressly authorized court to recognize foreign judgments not
falling under the Act based on principles of comity).
19. UFM-JRA, 13 U.LA. 149 § 3. The only U.S. states that have not adopted the UEFJA are Massachu-
setts and Vermont; Massachusetts has legislation pending to adopt it.
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Thus, the UFM-JRA and the UEFJA work in tandem. The UJFM-JRA provides a court
with the means and guidelines for recognizing a foreign monetary judgment. The
UEFJA, through its incorporation into the UFM-JRA, provides the manner of enforce-
ment. Despite this deceptively simple appearance, and the intention of the UFM-JRA and
the UEFJA to make the procedures for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
clearer and more uniform, states have still differed to some extent in how they have inter-
preted potentially conflicting provisions of the two Acts regarding the mechanics of recog-
nizing and enforcing foreign judgments. For example, while most states require a separate
action to be filed to determine whether a foreign judgment is entitled to recognition, a few
states proceed directly to the UEFJA requirement that a foreign judgment be registered
with the domestic court, as is done with judgments from a sister state, and do not require a
separate action to determine entitlement to recognition. 20 The practitioner is well-ad-
vised to review the requirements of the particular jurisdiction where recognition and en-
forcement are sought before proceeding.
C. COMMON LAW
In the twenty states that have not adopted the UFM-JRA, courts evaluate whether to
give recognition to a foreign judgment using general common law principles of comity. A
U.S. court will generally exercise its right to examine foreign judgments only on four
limited grounds, in order to determine: (1) if the original court had jurisdiction; (2)
whether the defendant received adequate notice of the proceedings; (3) if the proceedings
should be vitiated for fraud; and (4) whether the proceedings were otherwise contrary to
the public policy of the enforcing state.21 Absent a compelling basis for denying recogni-
tion and enforcement to a foreign judgment for failure to satisfy one of these four core
requirements, most U.S. courts will recognize and enforce monetary judgments entered in
foreign countries. 22
M. The Initial Statutory and Common Law Requirement for Recognition:
A Final, Conclusive, and Enforceable Foreign Judgment
In all U.S. states, the first requirement for recognition is a valid foreign judgment. Sec-
tion 2 of the UFM-JRA specifies that the Act applies to "any foreign judgment that is final
and conclusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pend-
ing or it is subject to appeal."23 A judgment is final if it resolves the underlying dispute in
its entirety.24 If finality is disputed, the court considers whether the judgment is final
according to the laws of the foreign country where the judgment was entered. 25 If the
judgment is facially final, the judgment debtor challenging finality bears the burden of
20. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A-49A-27 (2009).
21. Kwongyuen Hangkee Co. v. Starr Fireworks, Inc., 634 N.W.2d 95, 97 (S.D. 2001); see also Van Den
Biggelaar, 978 F. Supp. at 848.
22. Id.
23. UFM-JRA, 13 ULA 149 § 2.
24. Rail Servs. of Am. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 700, 705-06 (2003).
25. See Hernandez v. Seventh Day Adventist Corp., 54 S.W.3d 335, 337 (Tex. App. 2001).
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demonstrating that it is not in fact final. If it is not facially final, however, the judgment
creditor bears the burden of demonstrating that it is indeed final. 26
The comment to Section 2 states: "[w]here an appeal is pending or the defendant in-
tends to appeal, the court of the enacting state has power to stay proceedings in accor-
dance with Section 6 of the Act."27 Section 6 makes clear that a court may stay the
proceedings until a pending appeal has been decided, or until the expiration of the time
allowed to the defendant to pursue its appeal. 28 While the entry of a stay in proceedings
to recognize a foreign judgment pending the outcome of an appeal of that same judgment
seems to make sense, the court has discretion whether to enter such a stay, to require the
posting of a bond, or to order other relief pending the outcome of the appeal. 29 In some
cases, courts have not delayed in recognizing foreign judgments even when the judgment
is on appeal where it was entered.30
IV. Legal Requirements Under the UFM-JRA
A. MANDATORY CONDMONS
Other than a final, conclusive foreign judgment, the three mandatory requirements for
recognition of a foreign judgment are all due process-type considerations. The foreign
court must have: (1) rendered its judgment under a system that provides impartial tribu-
nals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process; (2) had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant; and (3) had subject matter jurisdiction over the contro-
versy.31 Each of these requirements is discussed below.
1. The Judicial System in the Foreign Nation Must Comport with Due Process
A party opposing recognition of a foreign judgment on grounds that the judicial system
where the judgment was entered did not comply with traditional notions of due process
bears the burden of establishing a lack of due process in the system as a whole, not just in
the particular case at issue. 32 Notably, this defense can be waived if the defendant moved
26. Id. (finding judgment facially final and other defenses waived for failure to timely assert, and therefore
recognizing judgment entered in Hong Kong against individual debtor).
27. UFM-JRA, 13 U.L.A. 149 § 2 cmt.
28. Id. § 6.
29. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS Act § 4(a), 13 U.L.A. 261 (1964) [hereinafter
UEFJA] ("if the judgment debtor shows the [court] that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or
will be taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign
judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the stay of execution expires or is
vacated, upon proof that the judgment debtor has furnished the security for the satisfaction of the judgment
by the state in which it was rendered").
30. See, e.g., S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enters. Ltd, 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (based on
testimony from three Romanian lawyers, court held that money judgment entered in Romania was final for
purposes of enforcement in New York, even though appeal was pending in Romania).
31. UFM-JRA, 13 ULA 149 § 4.
32. Pablavi, 58 F.3d at 1412 (foreign judgment not enforced against sister of Shah of Iran because she could
not have received due process in Iranian court at the time of judgment); see also Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Reinhart,
402 F.3d 982, 994-95 (10th Cir. 2005); Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2000). But
see UNtiF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION Acr § 4(c)(8), available at http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ufmjra/2005final.pdf [hereinafter UFCMJRA} (providing that the court
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to dismiss an action originally filed in the United States based on forum non conveniens and
sought to transfer the action to the foreign jurisdiction.33
Whether the judicial system in China comports with traditional notions of due process
is a more complex question. In decidingforum non conveniens motions, U.S. courts have,
on several occasions, evaluated Chinese courts to determine whether they provided an
adequate alternative forum.34 Certainly, the system in Hong Kong, which provides many
procedural safeguards comparable to those in the United States, satisfies the requirements
of due process. 35 Courts have also recognized decisions from Taiwan after concluding that
its system of justice comports with traditional notions of due process.36
The People's Republic of China (PRC), on the other hand, has its own separate and
distinct judicial system from that of Hong Kong and Taiwan, which arguably did not com-
port with Western notions of due process until the last decade or two. Until very recently,
there were no known decisions addressing the recognition of monetary judgments entered
in the PRC.37 Nonetheless, legal reform has been a priority in the PRC since the 19 90s
and has taken on several forms, with due process unquestionably being one of the focal
points. Examples of legal reform in the PRC over the past two decades have taken multi-
ple forms.
The first notable reform to the Chinese legal system was the 1982 adoption of the
Constitution of the People's Republic of China, which has been amended four times since
its adoption and has increasingly recognized the importance of human rights, due process,
and an impartial legal system to PRC's continuing development.38
need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if "the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the
judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due process of law").
33. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 634 F. Supp. 842, 852 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
34. See, e.g., Guimei v. General Elec. Co., 172 Cal. App. 4th 689, 700-01 (Ct. App. 2009) (finding courts in
Shanghai capable of adjudicating complex, multi-party product liability actions).
35. See, e.g., Downs, 298 A.D.2d at 178 (finding that there was ample evidence that the Hong Kong system
of justice comported with due process both before and after the transfer of sovereignty to China, the court
enforced a foreign judgment based on the UFM-JRA and general principles of comity).
36. See, e.g., Chou v. Shieh, No. G031589, 2004 WL 843708, at *7-8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2004) (finding
the alleged Taiwanese practice of providing notice to defendant by gluing notices of trial to the door of the
defendant's residence, even if true, did not establish a fundamentally flawed system, but rather seemed rea-
sonably calculated to give notice with at least the same degree of effectiveness as mailing the document to the
same address, and that defendant's claim that trial had been held on a date earlier than that contained in the
notice, may have, if true, reflected a flaw in this particular proceeding, but it did not demonstrate a system-
wide problem).
37. While applying different standards, it should be noted, however, that U.S. courts addressing motions to
dismiss actions filed on forum non conveniens grounds have, on occasion, granted the motions on the basis that
the PRC provided a suitable alternative forum for the parties' dispute. See Guimei, 172 Cal. App. 4th at 691;
Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007). See also Shao v. Ma, 861 N.E.2d
788 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (in remanding for a determination as to whether a Massachusetts probate court
must defer to a Beijing court's decision on custody and visitation issues, the court noted that the probate
court had failed to consider whether the procedural and substantive laws of China were comparable to those
of the probate court, as required by Massachusetts statute).
38. See, e.g., Xi.ss FA (Const.), art. 13 (2004) (P.R.C.) (recognizing private property rights), available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm; XA FA (Const.), art.
33 (2004) (P.R.C.) (recognizing that all citizens of the PRC are equal before the law and declaring the State's
respect for human rights). The Chinese Constitution was promulgated by the Announcement of the Nat'l
People's Cong. on Dec. 4, 1982 and subsequently amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2003.
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The next significant reform was the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of
China, adopted in 1991, which became the fundamental law governing civil trials and
proceedings.39 Its stated aim is "to protect the exercise of the litigation rights of the par-
ties, ensure that the people's courts ascertain facts, distinguish right from wrong, apply the
law correctly, try civil cases promptly, affirm the rights and obligations in civil affairs,
[and] impose sanctions for civil wrongs."40 The PRC Civil Procedure Law provides,
among other fundamental rights, that: (1) the parties to a civil lawsuit must have equal
litigation rights; (2) the court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; (3) the
parties have the right to have an attorney or agent represent them; (4) the defendant must
receive notice of the proceedings; (5) the defendant must have the right to cross examine
witnesses and present its own evidence and witnesses; and (6) the parties have the right to
appeal a judgment of the trial court.41
In 1995, the Judges' Law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated, mandat-
ing that "judges [... .] faithfully implement the Constitution and laws."42 The stated pur-
pose of the Judges' Law is "to ensure that the people's courts independently exercise
judicial authority according to law and that judges perform their functions and duties
according to the law." 43 In an inquisitorial legal system, like that of the PRC, where
judges have active roles in investigating claims and defenses, determining facts, applying
the law, and issuing judgments, this statute is considered fundamental to ensuring a fair
and impartial legal system."4
In one of the most recent efforts toward legal reform, which was primarily driven by a
desire to expand the due process rights of litigants, the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People's Congress adopted the first amendment to the 1991 PRC Civil Procedure
Law in October 2007.45 One of the purposes of the amendment was to clarify and
broaden the grounds for obtaining a new trial. 46 Prior to the amendment, dissatisfied
litigants found it very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a new trial. 47 Furthermore, the
procedures for conducting a new trial, even when granted, were not standardized from
one region to another.48 The amendment was designed to provide additional grounds and
procedures for obtaining and conducting new trials while still keeping the existing
grounds, thereby providing parties with greater certainty about their rights to obtain a
new trial, and expanding the options for a dissatisfied litigant.49 The new PRC Civil Pro-
cedure Law went into effect April 1, 2008.50
39. Civil Procedure Law (adopted at the Fourth Session of the Seventh Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 9, 1991,
promulgated by Order No. 44 of the President of the People's Republic of China, Apr. 9, 1991) art. 2,
available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.phpid=2694 (P.R.C.).
40. Id.
41. See id. arts. 8, 22, 50, 64, 66, 77-78.
42. Judges Law (adopted by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 30, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002)
art. 1, available at http-//en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.phpid=2692 (P.R.C.).
43. Id. art. 1.
44. See, e.g., Civil Procedure Law, art. 64.
45. CCCL, Perfection of Civil Retrial, Enforcement and Consistency Among Laws, available at http-/
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Consistent with all of these changes, which were intended to promote civil rights within
the PRC's judicial system, a U.S. district court recently granted recognition to a PRC
court's judgment for several million dollars against a U.S. company doing business abroad
in a case thought to be the first of its kind.sl In Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. (Robinson), the California-based defendant manufactured and
sold a helicopter to one of the two China-based plaintiffs, who had in turn leased it to the
other plaintiff for use in its commercial tourism business. 52 The helicopter crashed six
minutes into its first flight, killing all three passengers and leaving the pilot as the only
survivor.53 The two corporate plaintiffs first sued the helicopter manufacturer in Califor-
nia, where the defendant was domiciled.5 4 But Robinson moved for a stay based on forum
non conveniens, arguing the case should be brought in the PRC where the accident had
occurred. The trial court granted Robinson's motion.55
The plaintiffs subsequently re-filed their action in the PRC. Robinson was served with
notice of the PRC action, but it neither appeared nor presented any defense.56 At trial,
the plaintiffs presented evidence in support of their claims for product defect and strict
liability. In a lengthy opinion, which was anything but a rubber-stamp of the plaintiffs'
demand for damages or an ordinary default judgment, the PRC court analyzed the evi-
dence and awarded plaintiffs a portion of the damages they had sought for their business
losses.57
Following entry of the judgment in the PRC court, the plaintiffs brought an action in
federal district court in California to enforce their judgment against Robinson. After an
initial setback in district court, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and
remanded the case to the district court, where the plaintiffs finally received recognition of
their PRC judgment.s5 While the plaintiffs in Robinson were ultimately successful, it took
fifteen years from the date of the injury to finally obtain recognition of their foreign judg-
ment by a U.S. court. In fact, the case may not be over yet, as Robinson has indicated it
intends to appeal the district court's decision recognizing the PRC judgment. Notwith-
standing this fact, the Robinson case is a positive sign that U.S. courts may be less likely to
refuse recognition of judgments from the PRC on grounds that the proceedings did not
comport with traditional notions of due process.
2. The Foreign Court Must Have Had Personal jurisdiction Over the Defendant
For a foreign judgment to be recognized by a U.S. court, the court entering the judg-
ment must have had personal jurisdiction over the defendant.59 A number of U.S. courts
51. Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc., No. 2:06-CV-01798-
FMC, 2009 WL 2190187, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2009) .
52. Id.
53. Id. at *2.
54. Id. at *1.
55. Id.
56. Id. at *2.
57. Id. at *3.
58. Id. at 3, 7.
59. UFM-JRA, 13 ULA 149 § 4(a)(2).
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have refused to enforce foreign judgments for failure to demonstrate that this basic due
process consideration was afforded to the defendant in the foreign jurisdiction. 60
Section 5(a) of the UFM-JRA specifies six non-exclusive conditions, any of which will
conclusively demonstrate that personal jurisdiction was satisfied:
(1) the defendant was served personally in the foreign state;
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceeding, other than for the purpose
of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceedings or of
contesting the jurisdiction of the court over him;
(3) the defendant prior to the commencement of the proceedings had agreed to sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter
involved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state when the proceedings were initi-
ated, or, being a body corporate had its principal place of business, was incorporated,
or had otherwise acquired corporate status, in the foreign state;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign state and the proceedings in the
foreign state involved a cause of action/claim for relief arising out business done by
the defendant through that office in the foreign state; or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state and the
proceedings involved a cause of action/claim for relief arising out of such operation. 61
Where none of these six conditions can be relied on as a basis for personal jurisdiction
in the foreign state, courts will look at whether the foreign court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant comported with traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice, as those terms have been interpreted by U.S. courts.62
If the defendant is a U.S. manufacturer that placed its products into the stream of com-
merce in the foreign country (e.g., as Robinson did with its helicopters in China), and the
action arises as a result of an alleged product defect that caused injury in the foreign
country, it is likely that a U.S. court would find that these conditions satisfied the "trans-
acting business" prong of the minimum contacts analysis, so as to justify the foreign
court's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant. Robinson is the only known case ad-
dressing enforcement of a judgment entered against a U.S. manufacturer in China based
on a product-defect claim.63 In a product defect case filed in the United States against a
60. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of Can. v. Gorman, 769 N.Y.S.2d 369 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003) (creditor failed to
show that Canadian court had personal jurisdiction over debtor as required by UFM-JRA for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment); Siedler v.Jacobson, 383 N.Y.S.2d 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (defendant's
solitary act of purchasing antique from plaintiff in Vienna could not serve as jurisdictional predicate to grant
conclusive effect to default judgment sued upon).
61. UFM-JRA, 13 U.L.A. 149 § 5(a).
62. See, e.g., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Saxony Carpet Co., 899 F. Supp. 1248, 1253
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding defendant had sufficient contacts with Canada to support Canadian court's exercise
of personal jurisdiction, where contract was concluded in Quebec and cause of action arose in Quebec);
Nippon Emo-Trans. Co. v. Emo-Trans Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1215, 1230 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding thatJapanese
judgment could be enforced under New York's version of the UFM-JRA where, even though the bases for
jurisdiction articulated by the Japanese court were insufficient for jurisdiction under New York law, under the
standards of due process and New York's long-arm statute, jurisdiction could properly have been asserted
over the defendant in Japan).
63. Hubei, No. 2:06-CV-01798-FMC, 2009 WL 2190187, at *1.
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Hong Kong corporation, however, the court noted that where the Hong Kong manufac-
turer sold its product to another corporation that distributed the product in the United
States, the foreign manufacturer could be subject to personal jurisdiction in the U.S. state
where the plaintiff was injured if the manufacturer could reasonably have foreseen that its
product would be sold in the United States.64 Thus, based on Robinson and Alliance Cloth-
ing, a U.S. manufacturer that distributes a defective product would presumptively be sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction in China if its product is knowingly marketed to and sold in
China, and causes injury there.
In addition, while the test for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is different from
that for recognition of foreign money judgments, there have been at least two recent
decisions by U.S. courts enforcing arbitral awards entered in China related to the sale of
allegedly defective products. 65 In China National Metal Prods. Import/Export Co. v. Apex
Digital, Inc. a U.S. company initiated arbitration against a Chinese company in Shanghai
on a product defect claim.66 Shortly thereafter, the Chinese manufacturer initiated arbi-
tration against the U.S. company in Beijing for improperly withholding payment for all
goods furnished: both those claimed to be defective and those not claimed to be defec-
tive.67 The Beijing panel awarded a monetary judgment to the Chinese company, and the
Ninth Circuit upheld the confirmation of that award in the U.S. court.68 Similarly, in
China Three Gorges Project Corp. v. Rotec Industries, Inc., a Chinese business purchased alleg-
edly defective cranes from a Delaware corporation, and the cranes subsequently caused
death or injury to several people in China.69 The Chinese company pursued arbitration in
China, and following an award in its favor, successfully sought confirmation of the arbitra-
tor's award in an appropriate U.S. court.70 Thus, not only is a U.S. court likely to find a
foreign court had personal jurisdiction over a U.S. manufacturer when the manufacturer
knowingly sold defective products abroad and such products caused injury there, but U.S.
courts are also experienced in confirming foreign arbitration and judicial awards against
U.S. manufacturers in favor of foreign plaintiffs, including awards rendered in China.
3. The Foreign Court Must Have Had Subject Matter jurisdiction Over the Controversy
The foreign court must also have had subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy
for the judgment to be recognized in the United States.7 1 Few cases have been identified
challenging the foreign court's subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. In those rare
cases, however, the defense has generally been summarily rejected. 72
64. Alliance Clothing Ltd. v. District Ct. for Denver, 532 P.2d 351, 354 (Colo. 1975) (en banc).
65. See CBS Corp. v. WAK Orient Power & Light Ltd., 168 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (listing
seven exceptions to confirmation under Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards).
66. China Nat'l Metal Products v. Apex Digital, Inc., 379 F.3d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 2004).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 802.
69. China Three Gorges Project Corp. v. Rotec Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 04-1510JJF, 2005 WL 1813025,
at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2005).
70. Id. at *2.
71. UFM-JRA, 13 U.L.A. 149 § 4(a)(3).
72. See, e.g., Genujo Lok Beteiligungs GmbH v. Zorn, 2008 ME 50, 943 A.2d 573, 580 (finding judgment
debtor impliedly consented to jurisdiction of German courts in forum selection clause of agreement).
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B. DISCRETIONARY CONDYTIONS FOR RECOGNTTION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
UNDER THE UFM-JRA
1. The Defendant Received Sufficient Notice of the Proceedings
It goes without saying that a defendant should receive adequate notice of the proceed-
ings in the foreign court to allow him or her sufficient time to prepare and present a
defense.73 What is considered adequate notice, however, has been subject to interpreta-
tion. Interestingly, a handful of the cases declining to recognize a foreign judgment for
failure to satisfy the notice requirement did so based on a conclusion that the quality (i.e.,
the effectiveness) of the notice was lacking, rather than the timing of the notice, as specifi-
cally referenced in the statute.74 Conversely, in the only published case that could be
found addressing the adequacy of the timing of the notice of the foreign proceeding, the
court held that a U.S. defendant who received twenty-one days notice of a required re-
sponse date in the foreign forum and failed to respond had received adequate notice, such
that the foreign court's judgment was entitled to recognition in the United States.75
Notably, the express language of the UFM-JRA does not require technically effective
service for recognition of a foreign judgment, only an adequate quantity of notice. Sec-
tion 4(b)(1) of the Act reads: "A foreign judgment need not be recognized if (1) The
defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceedings
in sufficient time to enable him to defend" (emphasis added). 76 Arguably, only an adequate
number of days' notice, not service, is a factor to be considered in recognizing a foreign
judgment, and even then, it is a discretionary factor, not a mandatory one.
The court considered both the quality and quantity of notice in the Robinson case. First,
it found that the service of process had satisfied the requirements of Rule 4(d)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where the process papers had been left with an adminis-
trative assistant to Robinson's general counsel, combined with the general counsel's actual
receipt of the papers and a completed certificate of service from the U. S. Central Author-
ity attesting that service had been made according to the laws of the United States and in
compliance with article 5(a) of the Hague Convention.77 The court also found the five
weeks of notice that Robinson received to have been adequate based on People's Republic
of China Civil Procedure Law, which required that a foreign defendant receive at least
thirty days notice to submit a defense.78
73. UFM-JRA, 13 U.L.A. 149 § 4(b)(1).
74. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Seewald, 22 P.3d 580, 584-85 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (court declined to
recognize foreign judgment because the wife did not receive "adequate notice" of the foreign proceedings in
that there was a lack of demonstrable evidence that the wife had been personally served). See also Isack v.
Isack, 733 N.W.2d 85, 88 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (declining to enforce foreign judgment because wife did
not receive notice of the motion for summary disposition that resulted in the final judgment, although she
had notice of the foreign proceedings generally).
75. Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
76. UFM-JRA, 13 U.L.A. 149 § 4(b)(1).
77. Hubei, No. 2:06-CV-01798-FMC, 2009 WL 2190187, at *4.
78. Id. at *6.
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2. The Judgment Was Not Obtained by Fraud
Because the UFM-JRA does not explain what types of fraud might preclude recognition
of a foreign judgment in the United States, courts are left to their own interpretation on
this issue.79 Several courts have held that the fraud must relate to matters other than those
that could have been litigated, and must be fraud on the court.80 Some courts have re-
ferred to this as extrinsic fraud.9' In contrast, intrinsic fraud relates to issues that were
litigated in the prior proceeding, and alleged fraud of that variety generally would not
prevent recognition of a foreign judgment.82
3. The Judgment Is Not Repugnant to the Enforcing Court's Public Policy
U.S. courts may also refuse to enforce a foreign judgment because the claim or cause of
action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of the jurisdiction
where enforcement is sought.83 It is generally not considered grounds for non-recogni-
tion, however, that the foreign court's award of damages is inconsistent with state or fed-
eral law on the appropriate scope of damage awards.84
4. The Judgment Is Not in Conflict with Another Final and Conclusive Judgment
The defense that a foreign judgment should be denied recognition because it conflicts
with another final and conclusive judgment is infrequently raised, but does come up on
occasion. In a case brought under New York law, a woman sued her former husband for
enforcement of a judgment entered in another country relating to the ex-husband's
breaches of a separation agreement.85 The ex-husband moved for summary judgment on
79. Note that in the 2005 version of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act,
the authors have attempted to clarify the type of fraud that must be shown to invoke the defense. The new
provision provides that the foreign judgment need not be recognized if "the foreign country judgment was
obtained by fraud that deprived the losing party of an adequate opportunity to present its case." UFM-JRA,
13 U.L.A. 149 § 4(c)(2).
80. See, e.g., Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Hamilton, 501 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252-53 (D. Mass. 2007) (recognizing
foreign judgment based on finding that defendant's claim that he was fraudulently induced to become an
investor in English insurance market not only should have been raised, but was raised in the underlying
proceedings in England where it was rejected, and furthermore that the alleged fraud was not fraud upon the
court).
81. See, e.g., Mata v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1375, 1388-89 (D. Del. 1991) (holding that the
plaintiff widow's failure to disclose the fact that she had signed a waiver of claims under a whole life insurance
policy constituted fraud extrinsic to the original proceedings in Bolivia, thereby precluding recognition of the
Bolivian judgment in the United States).
82. Id. (internal cites omitted).
83. See, e.g., Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 249 (Md. 1997) (British libel judgment could not be
enforced in United States because contrary to U.S. public policy in favor of freedom of speech).
84. See Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702, 708 (Tex. Ct. App.
1998) (court could not refuse to recognize judgment entered in Canada on grounds that Canadian court's
calculation and award of damages in patent infringement case was improper and excessive, and therefore
violated Texas' public policy); McCord v. Jet Spray Int'l Corp., 874 F. Supp. 436, 439 (D. Mass. 1994) (Bel-
gian judgment that awarded damages to employee based on breach of at-will employment contract not recog-
nized under Massachusetts law was nonetheless not repugnant to state's public policy); Ackermann v. Levine,
788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986) (enforcement of foreign default judgment that included attorneys' fees was not
against public policy, even though inconsistent with U.S. court's law on recoverability of attorneys' fees).
85. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 517 F. Supp. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
SUMMER 2010
830 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
grounds that recognition of the other country's judgment was barred by a dismissal with
prejudice of a prior suit that the ex-wife had brought in another state for alleged breaches
of the separation agreement.86 In rejecting the ex-husband's motion and ruling for the ex-
wife, the court held that the dismissal of the prior state action with prejudice would likely
not be entitled to full faith and credit in New York because it was entered based upon
unauthorized actions of the ex-wife's attorney and the court clerk.87 The court further
held that the New York rule of enforcing the last-in-time of conflicting judgments, as well
as general principles of comity with respect to recognition of foreign judgments, war-
ranted giving recognition to the foreign country judgment.88
In a later case from New York, however, the court found grounds for rejecting the
discretionary New York rule that the latter of two conflicting judgments should prevail.89
These different approaches reflect the forum court's inclination to turn to the equities of
the case and to try to justify giving recognition to the judgment that it believes to be more
fair and in keeping with the public policies of the forum state when faced with conflicting
final and conclusive judgments.
5. The Judgment Is Not Inconsistent with an ADR Agreement Between the Parties
As with all of the defenses in Section 4(b) of the UFM-JRA, the existence of an alterna-
tive dispute resolution agreement between the parties, even if proven, provides a discre-
tionary, not a mandatory basis for refusing to recognize a foreign court's judgment.90
Courts that have addressed whether a foreign judgment should be recognized when it was
contrary to an agreement by the parties to arbitrate the dispute have reached differing
decisions. In one instance, the court held that the foreign court's decision that the defen-
dant had waived its right to arbitrate was contrary to the state's strong public policy favor-
ing resolution of claims through arbitration; therefore, the U.S. court declined to
recognize the judgment.91 In another case, the court found that the defendant had both
explicitly and implicitly waived the right to arbitrate, and that the enforceability of the
default judgment entered against the defendant by the Israeli court was not subject to
arbitration under the parties' arbitration clause.92 In sum, courts tend to evaluate the
enforceability of ADR clauses, asserted as a defense to the recognition of a foreign judg-
ment, much as they would if the action had originated in a U.S. court.
86. Id. at 616.
87. Id. at 623.
88. Id.
89. Byblos Bank Europe, S.A. v. Sekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketti, 885 N.E.2d 191, 194 (N.Y. 2008) (court
denied recognition to a Belgian judgment that conflicted with a previously rendered Turkish judgment, and a
German judgment granting the Turkish judgment reciprocity, because of the Belgian court's intentional dis-
regard for the principles of comity in re-trying issues between parties that had already been adjudicated
elsewhere).
90. UFM-JRA, 13 U.L.A. 149 § 4(b)(5).
91. Nicor Int'l Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1167 (S.D. Fla. 2004). See also Courage Co.
v. Chemshare Corp., 93 S.W.3d 323, 336 (Tez. App. 2002) (finding foreign judgment not entitled to be
recognized on grounds that parties had agreed to arbitrate their disputes).
92. Menorah Ins. Co. . Ltd. v. INX Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 221 (lst Cir. 1995).
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6. Where jurisdiction Is Based on Personal Service Alone, the Foreign Tribunal Was Not a
Seriously Inconvenient Forum
Section 4(b)(6) of the UFM-JRA provides that a court may deny recognition to a for-
eign judgment where personal jurisdiction in the foreign forum was based solely on per-
sonal service, and the foreign tribunal was a seriously inconvenient forum for the
defendant. 93 In virtually every case where this defense has been raised, the court has re-
jected the defense finding that personal jurisdiction was not based solely on personal ser-
vice.94 Thus, courts will seemingly go out of their way to find some alternative basis to
support a finding of personal jurisdiction in the foreign forum, thereby providing grounds
for rejecting a forum non conveniens argument under this section of the UFM-JRA.
7. Does the Foreign Court Reciprocally Recognize Judgments From the United States?
While not an acknowledged basis for denying recognition to a foreign judgment under
the UFM-JRA, the issue of reciprocity merits a short discussion. A few states that have
adopted the UFM-JRA have written in reciprocity as a discretionary factor to be consid-
ered in determining whether to recognize a foreign judgment. Georgia alone has incor-
porated reciprocity as a mandatory condition for granting recognition.95 Georgia's
incorporation is contrary to the overall trend in the United States, however, which is to
move away from requiring reciprocity as a condition to recognizing a foreign court's
judgments.96
In a number of other civil law countries, however, conclusive enforceability of foreign
money judgments is dependent upon reciprocity. Judgments rendered in the United
States have, in many instances, been refused recognition abroad, either because the for-
eign court was not satisfied that local judgments would be recognized in the American
jurisdiction involved, or because the U.S. jurisdiction involved would not give a certifica-
tion of reciprocity in countries where the existence of reciprocity must be certified to the
courts of the government.97 One of the goals of the authors of the UFM-JRA is that a
state's codification of its rules on the recognition of foreign money judgments will make it
more likely that judgments rendered in the state will be recognized abroad.
93. UFM-JRA, 13 ULA. 149 § 4(b)(6).
94. See, e.g., Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 689 (7th Cir. 1987) (jurisdiction based
in part on defendant's contacts with Belgium); Colonial Bank v. Worms, 550 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(jurisdiction based in part on defendant's prior agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the English court).
95. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-114(10) (1982).
96. 30 AM. JUR.2d Erecutions and Enforcement offudgment § 726. See aho Tonga Air Servs., Ltd. v. Fowler,
826 P.2d 204, 209 (Wash. 1992) ("[rleciprocity of recognition and enforcement is generally not required for
enforcement of foreign money judgments in the U.S."). Note that this is a departure from the historic U.S.
Supreme Court decision which made reciprocity a determinative factor by stating that a judgment rendered
by a court of a foreign country should not be given conclusive effect when, by the laws of that country,
judgments of the courts of the United States are reviewable on their merits. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1895). The reciprocity requirement is generally accepted to no longer be an element of the federal law on
enforcement of foreign judgments, but a few states still require it. See, e.g., McCord, 874 F. Supp. at 437.
97. See Peter Trooboff, Judgments Enforced, 30 NAT'L L. J. 12 (2007).
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V. Legal Requirements Under Common Law
In applying the common law principles of comity to a request for recognition of a for-
eign judgment, courts frequently follow the requirements set forth in Hilton v. Guyot.98
Hilton held that courts should:
recognize the judgments of foreign courts if (1) the foreign court had personal and
subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the defendant in the foreign action had adequate no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard; (3) the judgment was not obtained by fraud; and
(4) enforcement will not contravene the public policy of the enforcing state.9
Some courts have recognized an expanded list of requirements under Hilton. For exam-
ple, Van Den Biggelaar v. Wagner applies a six-part test in reliance on Hilton: (1) did the
foreign court provide an opportunity for a fair trial; (2) was the trial before a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) was there adequate notice or did the defendant appear volunta-
rily; (4) was the trial conducted upon regular proceedings; (5) was the trial held under a
system of jurisprudence that provides for the impartial administration of justice; and (6)
was there no evidence of fraud or prejudice in the system or by the court. 00 Other courts
have boiled these factors down to the four requirements cited in the preceding paragraph,
or some close variation thereof.Iol Analysis of these due process-type considerations pro-
ceeds much the same in courts applying a common law test as it does in courts applying
the state's version of the UFM-JRA.
VI. Cases Involving Efforts to Obtain Recognition in the United States of
Judgments Entered in China
Apart from judgments dealing with divorce and custodial issues, only a small number of
published cases have been identified involving attempts to enforce monetary judgments
entered in China in U.S. courts.102
Perhaps the earliest attempt to enforce a judgment entered in China was in Boyle v.
Semenoff'10 3 That action involved a claim by a trustee in bankruptcy for a foreign trading
company against a military officer and alleged debtor, seeking an arrest order against the
defendant based on a judgment for conversion entered in China.' The New York court
found the judgment was not entitled to recognition based on a number of factors, includ-
ing the plaintiff's failure to present the foreign judgment, the absence of evidence of the
foreign court's jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject matter, the lack of evi-
dence that the procedures in the forum court were such that they should be accorded
98. See, e.g., Phillips USA, Inc. v. Allflex USA, Inc., 150 F.R.D. 198, 201 (D. Kan. 1993).
99. Id. (quoting S.C. Nat. Bank v. Westpac Banking Corp., 678 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D.S.C. 1987)).
100. Van Den Biggelaar, 978 F. Supp. at 858.
101. See, e.g., Kwongyuen, 634 N.W.2d at 97.
102. An additional case was identified, but was determined not to be relevant to this discussion, in that it
involved a judgment entered in China against a Chinese foreign trade corporation, which the U.S. court
refused to recognize or enforce based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. See Transatlantic Shiffahrtskontor GmbH v. Shanghai Foreign Trade Corp., 204 F.3d 384,
391 (2d Cir. 2000).
103. Boyle v. Semenoff, 201 A.D. 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922).
104. Id.
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comity in the United States, and the lack of evidence that the defendant had notice of the
action in China. 05 This case was decided well before the UFM-JRA was written, but
nonetheless turns on many of the same due process considerations that comprise the law
of comity today.
Nearly eighty years later, the issue arose again in Kwongyuen Hangkee Co. v. Starr Fire-
works, Inc.'06 This case involved a fireworks company based in Hong Kong seeking to
enforce a monetary judgment based on a delinquent account against a U.S. distributor of
fireworks.107 The judgment was entered in the High Court of Hong Kong. 08 The de-
fendant had fully participated in the proceedings in Hong Kong, and had not appealed the
decision either on the merits or on jurisdictional grounds.109 The defendant also ac-
knowledged that the judgment was not fraudulently obtained.'o In addition, the court
noted that the system of law in Hong Kong provided for the impartial administration of
justice, and enforcement of the judgment did not contravene any public policy.III As
South Dakota is not one of the states that has adopted the UFM-JRA, the court relied on
the common law doctrine of comity in recognizing and enforcing the foreign judgment.112
The same year that the Supreme Court of South Dakota decided Starr Fireworks, the
Texas Court of Appeals decided Hernandez v. Seventh Day Adventist Corp." 3 In that case,
the court reversed a finding that a judgment from Hong Kong should be recognized based
on the fact that the judgment creditor had failed to timely file an authenticated copy of the
foreign judgment, as required under Texas' version of the UFM-JRA. The court found
that authentication was a statutory prerequisite that had not been satisfied.114 The au-
thentication requirement was a technicality peculiar to Texas' statute and the court's deci-
sion is not consistent with the generally more liberal approach of courts toward enforcing
foreign judgments if due process considerations are met.
Finally, the recently-decided Robinson case stands alone as the only known case recog-
nizing a monetary judgment entered against a U.S. defendant in a People's Republic of
China court. This case involved a defendant that had stipulated to: (1) personal jurisdic-
tion in an appropriate court in China, (2) tolling of the statute of limitations during the
pendency of the first-filed state court action, and (3) abiding by any final judgment ren-
dered in China as conditions of obtaining a stay of the state court action based on forum
non conveniens grounds."t5 Even then, it took the plaintiffs fifteen years from the date of
injury to obtain recognition of their People's Republic of China judgment in a U.S. court.
Thus, even where the U.S. defendant stipulates to jurisdiction in China, the substantive
105. Id. at 429.
106. Kwongyuen, 634 N.W.2d at 95.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 95-96.
109. Id. at 97.
110. Id.
111. The court noted that although Hong Kong had reverted to communist rule between the time the
dispute had arisen and the time suit was filed, Hong Kong was still operating under the English system of law
and there was every indication that the defendant had been given notice and an opportunity to present evi-
dence in his defense. Id. at 98.
112. Id. at 96.
113. Hernandez, 54 S.W.3d at 335.
114. Id. at 338.
115. Hubei, No. 2:06-CV-01798-FMC, 2009 WL 2190187, at *1.
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and procedural hurdles to obtaining recognition of a foreign judgment in the United
States should not be underestimated.
Admittedly, these four cases present only a limited glimpse at a few situations where
judgments entered in different regions of China have been granted or denied recognition
in the United States. But, because the principles governing recognition of foreign judg-
ments in the United States are uniform without regard to the nation where the judgment
originated, one can look to authority under the UFM-JRA pertaining to recognition of
judgments entered in any country for guidance of equal weight in assessing whether a
judgment from China will be granted recognition and enforcement under any given set of
facts.
VII. Procedures for Obtaining Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments
A. STEPS INVOLVED IN SEEKING RECOGNITION
As mentioned at the outset of this article, in most instances one must file suit before a
competent U.S. court as the first step toward obtaining recognition of a foreign judgment.
The pleading should state the name and address of the judgment creditor, and the name
and last known address of the judgment debtor. It should set forth the general nature of
the dispute and the particulars with respect to the name of the court and the date when the
foreign judgment was entered, as well as the amount of the judgment. It should also
attach an authenticated copy of the foreign judgment, along with a certified English trans-
lation of the judgment if the original is rendered in another language.
Once the defendant is served with the pleading, the case proceeds similarly to any other
type of civil action. The defendant must file an answer within the number of days pro-
vided by the applicable rule of civil procedure. If the defendant disputes that the foreign
judgment is entitled to recognition, it must assert one or more of the limited defenses to
recognition of a foreign judgment in its responsive pleading.
Discovery is permitted as necessary to develop the plaintiff's entitlement to recognition
of the foreign judgment and/or the defendant's entitlement to any asserted defenses. Be-
cause issues of liability and damages may not be retried, discovery is appropriately limited
and the case is generally submitted to the court for ruling on one or more summary judg-
ment motions. If there are disputed factual issues as to whether certain requirements for
recognition were met, (e.g., whether the defendant received adequate notice of the foreign
proceedings), the court may hold a trial to hear evidence before issuing its decision. Be-
cause the scope of relevant issues is expressly limited in actions to enforce foreign judg-
ments, these actions are generally resolved faster than actions seeking to impose liability in
the first instance.
Once the court has determined that recognition of a foreign judgment is warranted, the
court is required to ascertain the equivalent value in U.S. currency of the judgment en-
tered in the foreign nation where it was originally entered as of the date of the judgment,
and to render judgment for such value, along with court costs, and interest from the date
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of the original judgment." 6 Contemporaneous with recognition of a foreign judgment,
the court should issue a domestic judgment in the amount of the foreign judgment for
purposes of enforcing it. 1' 7
B. STEPS INVOLVED IN OBTAINING ENFORCEMENT
Once you have obtained recognition for your client's foreign judgment in the U.S. ju-
risdiction where the defendant resides, you now want to enforce the money judgment
there. Providing that the debtor has assets in the jurisdiction where the judgment has
been recognized, the judgment creditor has access to all the enforcement remedies of that
jurisdiction as if the case had originated there. Section 3 of the UFM-JRA expressly pro-
vides that a recognized foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judg-
ment of a sister state that is entitled to full faith and credit." 8
One temporary impediment to enforcement may exist if the foreign judgment is on
appeal, or subject to appeal. If the judgment debtor can establish that an appeal from the
foreign judgment is pending or will be taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted,
the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment until the appeal is concluded, the
time for the appeal expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated.1
VIII. Conclusion
The common law principles of comity, as codified in the UFM-JRA, generally control
whether a foreign judgment will be recognized and entitled to enforcement in a U.S.
court. While cases under the UFM-JRA abound, cases specifically addressing recognition
of foreign judgments entered in China are still relatively few. Based on developments in
the legal system in the People's Republic of China over the past two decades, it is increas-
ingly likely that a U.S. court evaluating whether to recognize a judgment entered in China
would conclude that the system of justice in China comports with traditional Western
notions of due process, and thus that element would likely not to be a bar to recognition
in a U.S. court. If the Chinese judgment otherwise meets the due-process type require-
ments of the UFM-JRA, there is nothing unique about judgments from China that should
interfere with their recognition and enforcement in any U.S. court under the same analy-
sis as a judgment entered in England, Canada, or anywhere else in the world.
116. See, e.g., Renoir v. Redstar Corp., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Farmer v. Orme, 21 P.2d
977 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933).
117. Renoir, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607.
118. See Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., 677 N.W.2d 874, 882-884 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
119. UEFJA, § 4.
SUMMER 2010

